Contrary to the usual discussion oflying or deceiving in medical ethics literature where the lying or deceiving is done by the doctor or surgeon, this paper deals with lying or deceiving on the part ofthe patient. Three cases involving HIV-infected male homosexual or bisexual persons are presented. In each case the patient deceives or wants the doctor to deceive a third party on his behalf. Are such deceptions or lies expressions ofcompassion? Are they in thepatient's best interests? Do they compromise the doctor's integrity? It is submitted that societal attitudes towards male homosexual acts were internalised by the men described in these cases. Thus, a dichotomy was created between the private life and the public image. Fear of condemnation by the doctor or others restricted communication towards the goal ofthe maintenance ofthe patient's health. The lack oftrust which inhibits truthtelling results in mutual and progressive isolation and impedes the provision ofoptimal care.
would have deceived Mr J, had he been the patient rather than his wife, or whether a woman surgeon would have deceived Mrs J are significant questions involving, inter alia myths of gender. As these questions have been discussed elsewhere (1), they need not detain us here (for the purpose of mentioning this case is to illustrate the initial point, namely, that when deceiving or lying is discussed in the literature the doctor is invariably the party who lies to, or who deceives, the patient).
What we want to do in this paper is to correct the omission noted above, namely to discuss situations in which the patient lies or deceives and/or expressly or deceptively requests the doctor to participate in and propagate a lie or deception, ostensibly for the patient's best interests or because of the patient's concern about the feelings of others. We shall do so by presenting three cases. All three cases discuss men who became HIV-infected through homosexual activity. Our scope of experience does not allow us to speculate on the prevalence of deception of health-care providers among individuals who acquire HIV infection in other ways.
Before presenting the cases we shall sketch in something of the legal-societal background which engenders pejorative attitudes towards homosexual males, and thus engenders the lying and deceiving one finds among HIV-infected individuals. Societal feelings, attitudes and actions against male homosexuals did not simply erupt in contemporary society, any more than they were created by the unexpected presence of the AIDS pandemic. The pejorative feelings, attitudes and actions, are deeply rooted in the history of western civilisation which has been shaped by the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition. Susan Sontag, in AIDS and its Metaphors got at most a half-truth right when she suggested that societal feeling is not against AIDS, but against the means by which such persons became infected. The crucial factor Sontag missed is the societal feeling against the existence of individuals with alternative lifestyles. It is this factor which facilitates attitudes against people with AIDS that is not present with most other diseases. It is thisfactor which makes AIDS a triply stigmatic illness: the stigma ofan infectious deadly disease; the stigma of having engaged in homosexual behaviour; and the stigma of being a homosexual.
The US Supreme Court in Bowers vHardwick (1986) in a 5-4 decision upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute (2) . The majority opinion of the court held that the constitution does not protect sexual relations between two consenting adult males even in the privacy of their own bedroom or home. Sodomy is defined by the Georgia statute as 'any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of the other'. The Georgia statute applies to heterosexual couples, women as well as men, but the court expressed no opinion on the constitutional protection of sodomy between heterosexual couples. The focus in Bowers v Hardwick is solely the issue ofsexual conduct between consenting males.
Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Case One JM, a 32-year-old bisexual man, was diagnosed as having AIDS after he developed Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia. His wife was aware of, and accepting of, his bisexuality. He told his parents of the diagnosis, but said that he had acquired the infection from a tattoo. He asked his doctor to corroborate his statement, should his doctor ever speak to his parents.
There are several ethical conflicts in this case that are important to identify: these conflicts involve medical confidentiality, autonomy of both patient and doctor, and the manner in which deception intersects with confidentiality and autonomy.
Medical confidentiality is an important feature of the doctor-patient relationship. In general terms, medical confidentiality is non-disclosure of information given to the doctor by the patient that the patient does not wish to be disclosed to third parties without his consent or permission. Why did JM disclose to his doctor that he was bisexual? There were two chief reasons. Firstly, he wanted to provide information about the mode of transmission of HIV infection; he perceived the information as contextually involved with the diagnosis of AIDS. JM believes this is information the doctor ought to know.
Secondly, the familial context: JM's wife knows he is bisexual and on the balance of probabilities she will have a major role in helping him cope with a chronic and fatal disease. In addition he may have transmitted HIV infection to her.
The doctor, in respecting the confidential information disclosed to her/him enhances the patient's autonomy, or self-determination. But the limitations ofrespect for confidentiality are apparent in a hospital context. The patient's secrets cannot be contained in a one-to-one relationship between revealer and listener. Others who have access to JM's chart in the course of discharging their responsibilities will potentially discover the secrets disclosed in the original patient-doctor consultation.
The presumption needs to be made that all professionals who have access to the chart are aware not only that they are reading the minutiae of a disease, but a transcript of the life of another person, including her/ his secrets, which are inseparably a part of a lived life. Respect for medical confidentiality can rightly be expected by the patient from each professional who has access to it. JM has expressed trust in his primary doctor in sharing or disclosing information that is confidential; the responsible doctor will discuss with JM why this confidential information must be charted and ergo the limitations of medical confidentiality; his secrets will be shared with other health-care providers.
But the doctor will also reassure him that the confidential information in the chart will remain confidential; the delivery of confidential, quality health-care is the achievement of team-work.
JM informed his parents ofthe diagnosis, but said he had acquired the infection from a tattoo. He is aware that the doctor might meet his parents and asks the doctor to lie to them about how he acquired AIDS. If he had said: 'Should you ever meet my parents I don't want you to tell them I am bisexual' he would be requesting legitimate protection of the information he disclosed during the original consultation. His request would be protected by patient-doctor confidentiality (compare by contrast the case discussed at beginning of this paper); but to ask his doctor to lie on his behalf has nothing to do with medical confidentiality. JM perceives the deception as an expression of compassion towards him; what he fails to do is show respect towards the doctor as an autonomous agent. To treat another as an autonomous agent is to concretise the philosophical doctrine of respect for persons; in this case the doctor has shown respect for the patient qua person but the patient is reluctant to accord the same respect to the doctor qua person. The conflict here is between truthfulness/truth-telling which has a central role in the doctor's value-system and conduct, and deception or lying which has a significant role in the patient's value-system. In medical ethics literature the emphasis is invariably on the patient's autonomy; the autonomy of the doctor is either ignored or rendered innocuous. In fact, in a clinical context there are two autonomous agents -the patient and the doctor.
In the case of JM the doctor refused to assent to his request to lie to his parents for the following reasons: a) truthfulness/truth-telling is a central value in her/his value-system and the value-system forms a fundamental part of her/his way oflife; b) the quality of the patient-doctor relationship would be unnecessarily burdened and impaired by deception; c) the crucial elements in health care of trust The two remaining features to be discussed in this case are c) the relationship between the health-care providers and the doctor, and d) the relationship between ST's mother and the doctor. Here we shall be brief. In c) the doctor should arrange to have a conference involving all of the health-care providers who participate in the care of ST and should emphasise the modes of transmission of HIV infection: discussion of fears, suspicions, anxieties and anger should be openly and freely expressed. In this way, the involved parties should be allowed of their own volition to arrive at the obvious conclusion, namely ST's lying/ deception. Discussion about why he thought or felt he had to deceive could facilitate mutual understanding of ST as a person.
d) The relationship between the patient's mother and the doctor. The patient's mother has accused the doctor of incorrectly diagnosing her son; he could not possibly be HIV-infected. The premise implies that ST's mother knows the modes of transmission and excludes her son from each one of these modes. The responsibility of the ethical and caring doctor will be to suggest to the patient's mother that she should discuss her concerns with her son, and with his permission or consent, obtain a second opinion. The doctor's suggestion of obtaining a second opinion has two benefits; one actual, the other potential. It would confirm her/his diagnosis, thereby helping ST's mother to understand her son's medical condition as it really is, thereby correcting her mistaken belief about it. And secondly, confirmation of ST's medical condition could potentially change the quality of the relationship, not for the worse but for the better. She might, in this way, come to see her son more fully as a person than she had before, and in so doing, recognise his ordinary needs for human intimacy and sexual expression. The sexual aspect of his being which is a part of his personal identity would be known to her. In this atmosphere ST's perceived need for deception could slip away. Instead of deception mutual trust and unconditional love might be evoked. Whether this happened in this case is unknown. The third case provides a parallel example.
Case Three GL, a 42-year-old school principal, moved across the country to live with his parents in a small midwestern town shortly after being diagnosed with AIDS. He made elaborate preparations for his death and funeral. He indicated that he was in pain and that he could not function at home, and that his elderly parents could no longer bear the burden of caring for him.
Upon admission, his case was treated routinely. He refused certain comfort measures, stating, 'I've come to the hospital to die' but requested increased doses of intravenous morphine for pain control. The nurses found his attitude alarming, in view of the fact that he was eating well, his pain was easily controlled, and he was observed to move about his room with little difficulty. He continued to enjoy interacting with hospital staff and his parents, as long as he was in control of the interaction. His presence led them to question the motive for hospitalisation and led to suspicion among the hospital staff that the doctor was assisting the patient in suicide. It became clear that his care could easily have been managed at home or in another facility but the patient refused to consider any alternative to hospitalisation. After several care conferences he acknowledged that his condition was not imminently terminal, and he reluctantly accepted transfer to a nearby residential hotel.
Before moving to the midwest GL had lived with his wife and two children in a large city. He told his colleagues that he had leukaemia and that he was going to his parent's home to die since he wished to allow his wife and children to continue their lives without being a burden to them. He sought oin-going medical treatment at a large hospital located some distance from his parents' home, so that he could keep his diagnosis secret from other relatives in the area. GL told his doctor that the highest priority in his case was continued confidentiality. 
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